The Effects of Feedback on Improving Safe Work Behavior: A Component Analysis by Williamson, Jeanine L.
University of Central Florida 
STARS 
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations 
1985 
The Effects of Feedback on Improving Safe Work Behavior: A 
Component Analysis 
Jeanine L. Williamson 
University of Central Florida 
Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/rtd 
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu 
This Masters Thesis (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, 
please contact STARS@ucf.edu. 
STARS Citation 
Williamson, Jeanine L., "The Effects of Feedback on Improving Safe Work Behavior: A Component 
Analysis" (1985). Retrospective Theses and Dissertations. 4744. 
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/rtd/4744 
1HE EFFECTS OF FEEDBACK 
ON IMPROVING SAFE WORK BEHAVIORS: 
A CDMPONENT ANALYSIS 
BY 
JEANINE LANE WILLIAMSON 
B.A., University of Central Florida, 1983 
1HESIS 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the Master of Science degree in Industrial/Organizational Psychology 
in the Graduate Studies Program of the College of Arts and Sciences 
University of Central Florida 
Orlando, Florida 
Summer Term 
1985 
ACKNOWLEix;EMENTS 
With the greatest sincerity, I wish to thank the members of my 
committee: Drs. Richard 1\Jcker, Edwin Shirkey, and, especially, 
Janet 1\Jrnage. Your encouragement and guidance with this paper and 
throughout the years have been greatly appreciated. In addition, 
I wish to thank Dr. David Abbott for his assistance with the 
s atistical analyses needed for this paper. 
Special thanks are also extended to Alfred Dsgon and the 
employees of the Bureau of Refuse Collection for the City of Orlando. 
The cooperation given was an experimenter's dream. 
This paper is dedicated to three special people: first, my two 
loving parents who have seen me through it all; and, finally, my 
wonderful husband, Jeff, whose love, patience, and understanding have 
helped me through everything . 
ii 
LIST OF TABLES 
LIST OF FIGURES 
INTROIXJCTION 
METHOD 
Setting and Subjects 
Behavioral Analysis 
asure . . . . . . 
I€sign and Procedures 
RESULTS 
Analysis of Variance 
Subjects' Reactions 
Accident Da.ta 
DISCUSSION 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
APPENDIX A Individual Consent Sheet 
APPENDIX B Behavioral 01ecklist 
REFERENCES 
iii 
iv 
v 
1 
9 
9 
10 
11 
12 
15 
15 
19 
21 
22 
26 
27 
• • . • • 28 
1. 
2. 
LIST OF TABLES 
M=an Percentage of Safety Performance for F.ach Phase 
Summary Data for Trend Analysis F(1, 27) ..... 
iv 
17 
20 
LIST OF FIGURES 
1. ~an Percentage of Safety Performance for Each Type 
of Feeclba.ck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
2. ~an Percentage of Safety Performance for Each Phase . 
v 
16 
18 
INTROOOCTION 
~cline in the growth rate of worker productivity as well as the 
failure of other types of organizational development strategies to 
improve productivity has resulted in considerable interest in 
s rategies to change employee behavior. This situation has led to the 
rapid growth of organizational behavior modification (OBM) as an 
approach o organizational change . Performance feedback interventions 
have been used in numerous settings to improve work behaviors 
(Prue & Fairbanks, 1981). OBM has worked especially well in improving 
saf work behavior in the work place. However, when new approaches 
are used in dealing with human behavior, much systematic, thorough 
research must be conducted to ascertain the benefits of the components 
of ha approach. OBM has basically four components: observation, 
measurement feedback, and reinforcement. The focus of this study is 
the component of feedback. Many studies, which will be discussed in 
more detail later, have dealt with feedback in conjunction with other 
factors, such as supervisory praise, training, and goal-setting. 
These other factors have confounded the value of feedback. Therefore, 
the purpose of this study is to ascertain the value of feedback to 
OBM. 
Behavior M:xiification principles are relatively simple. 
B. F. Skinner is thought of as the father of this approach. His view 
evolved from an approach known as operant conditioning. 'Illis approach 
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places emphasis on overt , observable behaviors instead of inferred 
motives or hypothesized needs. 1he pr inciples of operant conditioning 
state that an individual is shaped by condit ions in the environment. 
Usually, as the conditions change, the behavior changes. Similarly, 
the Skinnerian viewpoint states that in the enVironmefrr, there are 
antecedents which influence in:iividuals t o behave in a certain manner. 
'Ihis behavior has certain consequences which det ermine whether the 
behavior will be likely to occur in the future . For example, if a 
worker has an extremely heavy work load (antecedent), he then responds 
to this situation by working very fast and ef ficient ly (behavior). 
This worker's supervisor recognizes the extra effort and commends the 
VK)rker on the job wel 1 done (consequences) . This consequence was 
positive; therefore, the likelihood of that response occurri ng in the 
future is increased. As evidenced in this example , behavior 
modification adapts to the work place well. Ski nner himself consulted 
with Emery Air Freight to improve performance (Feeney , 1972). By 
observing the work place to pinpoint antecedent s , then measuring 
actual employee behaviors, managers were able t o distribute effective 
consequences, which were feedback and re inforcement. The results 
showed the behavior improved dras t ically and t he company saved 
thousands of dollars annually. 
There are many advantages t o using perf ormance feedback 
interventions in t he work place . First , these interventions are 
inexpensive to linplement relat ive t o ot her pr oductivity-enhancement 
techniques (Feeney , 1972). Second, perf ormance feedback programs 
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are simple t o implement since prolonged, cumbersome, and 
sophisticated training programs are seldan required. 'Ihird, feedback 
interventions often decrease the use of unprogrammed aversive control 
procedures which are the typical contingency arrangements found within 
organizations. Informal ohservations of the overt behavior and verbal 
comments of ~rkers during feedback interventions suggest that 
{X)Sitive control over behavior increases and aversive control 
decreases following implementation of performance feedback programs 
(Kanaki, Barwick, & Scott, 1978). Finally, feedback interventions are 
attractive in organizations that may not have access to other 
intervention strategies. For example, many organizations find the 
range of programmable reinf orcers restricted by factors such as union 
constraints UJX)n the use of monetary incentives or rewards for 
incr ased productivity. 
A primary concern of organizations is to ensure the safety and 
health of the organization's employees. The problem of industrial 
acciden s is still JX)Orly understood and resistant to solution. 
Historically, many studies focused on the relationship between 
accidents arrl factors that are, from the standinint of management, 
difficult to alter, for example, age, experience level, and 
personality characteristics of the work force. Also, these studies 
~uld only record measurements before and after the interventions. 
A cause-effect conclusion could not be made. Finally, the 
measurements taken were usually accident reports or possibly only 
lost-time accidents (Crawford, 1960, 09.vids & Mahoney, 1957, 
Verhaegen, Vanhalst, Cerijcke, & VanHoecke, 1976). These happenings 
occur rarely, only t\\O to three times per month in some settings. 
~asurements of human behavior need to be taken of ten because human 
behavior, namely, safe work behavior, has high variability; and, 
therefore, frequent measurements would yield more valid results. 
There have been many studies conducted in recent years utilizing 
OBM principles to improve safety. Sulzer-Azaroff and [',e Santamaria 
(1980) id n ified hazardous conditions in the physical surroundings 
such as spills not cleaned irrrnediately, guard rails in disrepair, 
and then posted observational measures (feedback) around a 
manufac uring plant. This feedback was sufficient to reduce hazards 
in the plant. In a study by Haynes, Pine, and Fitch (1982), vehicle 
accidents were reduced among urban transit operators by use of 
fe dback, incentives, and competition, but the components were 
confounded. Finally, Zahar, C.Ohen, and Azar (1980) used feedback 
plus token economies to improve safe work behavior. 
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Opponents of OBM state that OBM is not simple, original, or 
consistent (Locke, 1980). Cbal-setting theorists explain results of 
behavior mcx:lif ication studies by rationalizing that it is not feedback 
but the goal-setting component that motivates subjects to improve 
behavior (Locke, 1978). Locke, Cartledge, and Koeppel (1968) have 
argued that studies have shown that feedback alone is not sufficient 
to change behavior. The studies this author cites, though, are not 
methodologically sound or industrially-based. Cbal-setting theorists 
contend that it is not instinct or environment, but cognitive 
processes inside human beings that mot i vat e people to achieve their 
goals arrl improve behavior (Locke, 1977) . Goal-setting theorists 
argue that behaviorists ignore these cognitions and, in effect, 
that the rationale for OBM is completely wrong. 
In argument, though, principles in OBM s t at e that cognitions do 
exist; but there is no way to outwardly measure these cognitions. 
Behaviors can be measured and antecedents can be controlled; 
therefore it is only logical to manipulate these components. Also, 
OBM principles state that a criterion should be set (goal-set ting) 
to determine when to reinforce (Kazdin, 1980) . To date, there has 
been no proper comµ:ment analysis to determine i f simple feedback, 
without specified criteria, will improve behavior. Also , i t has not 
been determined to what degree the added component of goal-setting 
will improve behavior. 
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'Ih se issues have been addressed in t-w:> major studi es that 
relate directly to the study being proposed (Komaki, Barwick , & Scott, 
1978; and Kornaki, Heinzmann, & Lawson, 1980 ) , and ooth are concerned 
with occupational safety. The first study took place at a food 
manufacturing plant. This study, in behavioral ter ms, defined which 
behaviors constituted safe work behavior s. Behavi ors were emphasized 
instead of the vague terms normally used, such as ''be careful" and 
"less rushed" which were the standard practice previous to this study. 
Investigation showed that these behaviors were hardly ever rewarded or 
even recognized. 'Ille l ogic used here is if one could increase safe 
wor k perfor mance by reinfor cement , then accidents, which are an 
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outcome of unsafe work behavior, would decrease. In this study, 
workers from the plant were given an explanation and visual 
presentation of the desired behaviors . Trained raters observed 
employees' behavior and documented how many safe work behaviors were 
observed and how many unsafe work behaviors were observed. A graph 
was then i;x:>sted after every observation which gave the percentage of 
time safe WJrk performance was observed. Supervisory praise was given 
for improvements. Employees in the tWJ departments substantially 
improved their safety performance from 70% and 78% to 96 % and 99%, 
respectively. Dwring reversal phase, performance returned to baseline 
(71 % and 72%). It should be noted that praise (verbal reinforcement) 
and goal-setting were used in the intervention in conjunction with 
feedback and, therefore, the value of feedback was confounded by the 
o her components. 
The second study, Komaki, Heinzmann, and Lawson (1980), was 
conducted tWJ years later in a vehicle maintenance department for a 
large city. This study was designed in a very similar manner to the 
former study. Training was separated from feedback and goal-setting 
to see which variable provided the most improvement. A multiple-
baseline design with a reversal comi;x:>nent was used in which five 
conditions were introduced: (a) Baseline, (b) Training Only 1, 
Cc) Training and Feedback 1, (d) Training Only 2, and Ce) Training and 
Feedback 2. It was concluded that training alone was not a sufficient 
means of improving and maintaining performance. Here again, goal-
setting and supervisory praise was used in conjunction with feedback. 
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In a study by Reber and Wallin (1984), it was demonstrated that 
training plus goal-setting plus feedback was the optimum setting for 
improving safe work performance at a farm machinery manufacturing 
plant. With the addition of one factor, the performance was improved. 
Two factors resulted in more improvement, and finally, feedback, 
the third factor, provided even more improvement. However, the effect 
of feedback was confounded by the first tv-D factors of training and 
goal-set ing thus the value of feedback by itself was never computed. 
Ilgen, Fisher, and Taylor (1979) have thoroughly reviewed the 
literature on feedback. They state that feedback about effectiveness 
of an individual's behavior has long been recognized as essential for 
1 arning rmd for motivation in performance-oriented organizations. 
The understanding of feedback effects in ongoing work organizations is 
hampered by a lack of corrmunications between the integration of human 
performance ar.d the motivation orientations toward feedback. This 
review pointed out the weakness of l.ocke's seminal work in goal-
setting. Locke's focus was primarily on goals, not feedback, and, 
therefore, concentrated exclusively on goal-relevant aspects of 
feedback. Emphasis should be placed on all aspects of feedback, 
namely the effect of feedback isolated from other factors. Also, 
Ilgen et al. identified a need to establish whether specificity 
of the feedback is an important issue, especially where goals are 
presented in conjunction with feedback. 
This study proposed to establish what effect feedback had on 
improving safe work behaviors. A multiple-baseline design was used 
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with the first phase being the baseline measur es . The second phase of 
the study was isolation of feedback with no s t a t ed goals. It was 
hy'(X)thesized that safety performance YK>uld improve during this phase. 
The third phase was the introduction of mcxlerately-difficult goals 
that were mutually set, to ascertain how much improvement there was in 
the feedback-only phase (second phase) as compared t o 
feedback-plus-goal-setting phase (third phase) . I t was hypothesized 
tha safety performance would improve even more during t his third 
phas . 'Ihe fourth phase was total reversal phase wher e all components 
were withdrawn. It was hy'(X)thesized that safety performance would 
eturn to baseline or near-baseline level. Final ly, the fifth phase 
was the reintroduction of the feedback-only phase . It was 
hy'(X)th sized that safety performance would improve agai n. Secondly , 
it was established through analysis of variance, whether specificity 
of the f edback in regards to irrlividual versus group f eedback , was 
an im'(X)rtant canµ:ment in improving safe behavior s. It was 
hy'(X)thesized that individual and truck feedback groups would have 
similar improvement and that the group feedback group would be 
different from these two groups. 
METHOD 
Setting and Subjects 
This study was conducted in the Bureau of Refuse Collection of a 
medium-sized southern city's department of public works. 'Ihe bureau 
had one of the highest accident rates in the city, recording almost 
15 claims per month per 100 employees. 'Ihis figure was well above the 
average rates for refuse collection workers in the nation (N:ltional 
Safety C.ouncil, 1983) . 'Ille individual in charge of Risk Management 
and Training of the city selected the :&rreau of Refuse C.Ollection 
because there had been recent concern expressed by city officials to 
decrease lost-time accidents arrong city employees. Also, the very 
nature of he job of refuse collection worker was very hazardous, plus 
the high accident rate relative to other bureaus within the city 
contributed to the decision. 
The Bureau of Refuse C.ollection is responsible for the 
collection and disposition of all commercial and residential refuse 
within the city limits. The section that is responsible for the 
commercial routes services businesses and large establishments where 
metal garbage containers are used. On these routes, there is usually 
one driver and one 'helper." 'Ihe section that is responsible for 
residential routes mainly services curb-side pick-up from private 
residences. On these routes, there is one driver and tm "taters" 
for each truck. 
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The subjects that were chosen for this study are the taters 
that service the residential routes. An examinat ion of past accident 
r eports showed that the taters accounted for a l ar ge portion of the 
cl aims wit hi n the bureau. Subject consent (See Appendix A) was 
obtai ned during an orientation meeting where the study was explained 
ver bally to t he subjects. Written consent was then obtained by the 
signing of an individual consent form which outlined t he purix>se and 
condi ions of the s t udy. 'Ihere were 30 subjects, 29 males and 
1 female . Their mean age was 32.5 years old, and the mean experience 
level was 5 years. The median pay rate was $6. 23 per hour , which was 
$1 . 00 per hour more han other city laborers . Employees worked four 
10-hour days with weekends arrl Wednesdays off. They worked on what is 
r ferred as a "task f orce ," where, regardless of when their work was 
completed they were paid t he full 10 hours. For example , i f a crew 
was finished in 8 hours , they were paid for a 10-hour day. 
Behavioral Analys i s 
A preliminary assessment of the antecedent s and consequences of 
behavior was conducted to determine fact or s that led t o unsafe work 
behaviors. At the onset of the study, the t ask f orce method for the 
everyday work period reinforced the rapid , carel ess manner of the 
taters. For instance, if the toter violated some safe work standards 
and reduced the total work hours, he/she was rewarded at the end of 
the day because he/she left work earl y . Theref ore, that employee was 
likely to violate more safe \.\'Or k s t andards in the future. 
Observation also irrlicated that even When an employee was working 
safely, he/she was rarely rewarded for doing so. 
There were safety posters arrl reminders in t he employee 
breakroom. A safety meeting was held for al l employees every month 
where various topics were discussed, but there was no formal safety 
training provided to new employees. 
~asure 
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To generate specific, essential safe work behaviors, accident 
reports were examined from the past three years. Prevent ive behaviors 
were obtained from these reports. Observation of the Y.Drkers and 
consultation with the supervisors also provided information that 
help d generate this observational checklist. 1ne checklist behaviors 
are behaviors that, when performed, Y.Duld dimi nish the chance of an 
accident. For instance, some behaviors were ' 'wear cl ot h gloves at all 
times," ''bend knees when picking up boxes , shrubs , et c .". (The 
complete Behavioral Oi.ecklist is provided i n Appendix B.) 
'IWo trained raters served as nonpart icipant observers. There was 
one main rater, with an additional r ater brought in to obtain 
inter-rater reliability . Each item on t he checklist was coded as 
safe, unsafe, or unobserved . The percent age of total observed safe 
Y.Drk performance was cal cul ated as t he number of safe items divided by 
the total number of items observed , unsafe plus safe, and multiplied 
by 100. Each observation lasted f or a t otal of 30 minutes. 
Observations t ook place f our days per week with four observations 
per day. The raters f ound t he particular trucks on which the subjects 
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worked and observed the toters in the res idential areas. 'Ihe 
observers followed the trucks in their own personal car, and the 
subjects knew they were being observed . 'Ihe exact t imes of 
observation varied; no observation was carri ed out at the same t ime of 
day on any tv.;o consecutive days . 
A total of 300 observations was conducted over a 12-week period 
of time. Inter-rater reliability was asses sed 30 times , for an 
average of one reliability check every 10 observations. 'Ihis was done 
by having a second observer accompany the primary observer. Both 
observers observed the same subject simultaneously, h.It independently. 
A percentage agreement method was used in which the number of 
agreements was divided by the number of agreements plus disagreements 
and mul iplied by 100. Reliability averaged 79 . 6% agreement for all 
groups. Reliability suffered somewhat because the pr imary observer 
was required to observe arrl drive the car that was following the 
truck. The secondary observer was merely required to observe the 
subjects. A higher average could have been obtained if bot h observers 
were required to drive arrl observe . When this was done at the end of 
the study, the reliability checks had a much higher agreement of 
83.4%. Simple economical restrictions hampered this method from being 
used for the entire duration of the study. 
~sign and Procedures 
A multiple-basel ine des ign wit h a r eversal component was employed 
with a total of five phases: Baseline , which lasted tv.a weeks; 
Feedback Only 1, whi ch las ted tID weeks; Feedback and Coal-setting, 
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which lasted tWJ weeks; tb Feedback--NJ Cbal-setting, which lasted tWJ 
weeks; and Feedback Only 2, which lasted tID weeks. 
The 30 subjects were randomly assigned to three different groups. 
'Ihe first group of 10 people received individual feedback immediately 
following each observation. The main rater handed the irrlividual 
subject his/her individual graph with his/her individual performance 
plott d on the graph . The rater was available to answer questions if 
necessary b..i no encouragement or verbal reinforcement was given. 
The second group of 10 people received feedback for their individual 
trucks (two people per each feedback report) and feedback was 
distributed in the same manner as the individual feedback. The third 
group of 10 people received feedback for that entire group, and 
after all 10 subjects were observed feedback was given in the form 
of a poster posted by the time clock; the main rater stood close 
o the pos er every morning to answer questions for these subjects 
also. The phases started and stopped at various times for each group; 
therefore, when safety performance changed only when the intervention 
was implemented, one could rule out alternative plausible hyp::>theses 
with much greater confidence. 
The feedback was given in the form of a plotted graph on white 
JX)ster board, 3 ft. x 2 1/2 ft., or 8 1/2 in. x 11 in. white paper, 
depending on the type of group . Also, the behavioral checklist was 
provided in the first week of the Feedback Only 1 Phase. 'Ihe graph 
was posted six inches away from the time clock for the group that 
received group feedback. For the irrlividual and truck feedback, 
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the subjects received feedback privately and individually. 
Immediately after each observation, a new point was placed on the 
graph. Ulring the goal-setting phases, a dotted line was drawn on the 
graph to in::licate the specified goals. Cbals were mutually set by the 
main rater and the subject(s) at the time of feedback distribution. 
'Ihe rater suggested 10- 20% increase as a goal, but input from the 
subjects was a requirement. 
RESULTS 
Data were collected for 30 subjects with 10 observations per 
subject for a total of 300 observations over a 12-week period of time. 
Figure 1 shows the mean percentage of safe performance for each type 
of feedback across each week during the observation sessions. Summary 
data for the three different types of feedback are presented in 
Table 1 and Figure 2. 
Analysis of Variance 
The research design implemented three levels for types of 
f edback five levels for phases (treatments) and tv;o levels for 
weeks. 'Ill.is created a 3 x 5 x 2 repeated measures analysis of 
variance that was appropriate for testing the hyµ:>theses. The result 
was a highly significant main effect for phase of the study 
(F(4, 108) = 58. 33, p ( .001), but no main effect for type of feedback 
(F(2, 27) = .11, p ).05). There was also a significant interaction 
term for tyP= of feedback and phase of the study (F(8, 108) = 
2. 3 7 ' p < . 05 ) . 
In a planned comparison, there was no difference between truck 
and group feedback (F(4, 108) = . 29, p ) .05). W"ien these tm 
types of feedback were combined and then contrasted with individual 
feedback, there was a significant contrast (F(4, 108) = 
4. 45' p < . 01 ) . 
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Figure 1 : Mean Percentage of Safety Performance for Each Type 
of Feedback . 
TABLE 1 
MEAN PERCENTAGE OF SAFETY PERFORMANCE FOR EACH PHASE 
PHASE INDIVIOOAL TRUCK GROUP OVERALL 
Bas line .55 .59 .60 .58 
F ed back Only 1 .66 .68 . 70 .68 
Feedback and Cbal-setting . 79 . 74 . 73 . 75 
Reversal .68 .66 .6 7 .6 7 
Feedback Only 2 . 73 .69 . 72 . 71 
NJte. Percentage of Safe Performance = safe behaviors observed 
total observed behaviors 
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Figure 2: ~an Percentage of Safety Performance for Each Phase 
A quadratic trend was tested because it was hyp:>thesized that 
performance would increase, then decrease during reversal. A cubic 
trend was tested because it was hyinthesized that performance would 
increase, then decrease, and f:inally increase again after 
reintroduction of Feedback. A trend analysis for phase of the study 
was conducted and the results are shown in Table 2. 
Subjects' Reactions 
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Although subject responses were not formally questioned, informal 
observation irrlicated favorable reactions. l'-bst of the subjects were 
anxious to know how they were doing even before baseline data 
collection was complete. The interaction between the subjects and 
the observers was quite friendly. 
DJ.ring the course of the study, no complaints were expressed 
about he presence of the observers. This was surprising because 
having an automobile follow the truck is somewhat bothersome. As a 
matter of fact, the toters were quite helpful in informing the 
observer the streets that were next or when the truck would be backing 
up. 
It also appeared that canpetition among subjects had little 
effect on the subjects. Since feedback was given individually and 
privately, little opp:>rtunity for comparison was available. When 
questioned whether they were competing with fellow subjects, the 
subjects stated they were not. 
TABLE 2 
SUMMARY DATA FOR TREND ANALYSIS F(1, 27) 
TYPE OF FEEDBACK 
Ov rall 
Individual 
Group and Truck 
Individual vs. Group and Truck 
Irrlividual vs. Group and Truck 
(Phase 1-3) 
Group and Truck (Phase 1-3 ) 
Individual (Phase 3-4) 
Group and Truck (Phase 3-4) 
Overall (Phase 1-2) 
Individual vs. Group and Truck 
(Phase 1-2) 
LINEAR QUADRATIC 
61.08-H'* 54.06*** 
40.86*** 30.37*** 
25. 51 "'-*'\- 26.09"~ 
5.31* 2.40 
9.52** 
65. 55m\-
49. 45"'-* 
40. 16*"~ 
55.45*** 
. 25 
l'bte. Overall = observations swnmed across groups. 
*"k-;\- p < . 00 1 
-;\-* p < .01 
* p < .05 
ClJBIC 
44.39*** 
14.53** 
29 .86i-.** 
1. 72 
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Accident Data 
DJring the middle of the study, a city-wide safety education and 
incentive program was implemented. To isolate the effects of this 
program, accident reports for the entire bureau were examined and then 
compared with accident reports for the toters alone. 
The total incidence rate for the entire bureau in 1984 was 176. 15 
injuries per 100 employees. The toters accounted for 42.3% of the 
injur s during 1984, but they only accounted for 24.6% of the 
i:npulation within the bureau. DJring the three-month period of the 
study the toters reduced the percentage to 33% of the injuries. 
An ob ained chi square of 3.92 (df = 1, p < .05) illustrated that 
frequency of accident reports for toters was significantly different 
from he rest of the employees in the bureau. 
DISCUSSION 
1he results of this study illustrate the imp::>rtance of feedback 
in improving safe work behaviors. 1he linear trend analysis 
demonstrated that there was a significant difference between Baseline 
and Feedback Only 1 phases for all types of feedback. D.rring Feedback 
Only 1 there was improvement of safe work behaviors. The theoretical 
implications would suggest that, contrary to Locke's statements 
(Locke, 1978), feedback isolated from all other factors was 
reinforcing for all subjects . Also, Hawthorne effects can be ruled 
out because safe performance decreased during reversal. 
1he linear trend analysis also demonstrated that Feedback and 
Cbal-setting was the optirm.un condition for improving behaviors. This 
coincides with OBM literature that states that feedback used with a 
specified criterion will warrant the best improvement. Therefore, 
the results of this study would indicate that behavioral safety 
programs should contain l::xJth components. 
The percentage of safe behaviors did not return fully to baseline 
level during the reversal phase. One explanation for this occurrence 
could be that the t~-week period was not sufficient time for the 
behaviors to stabilize in reversal. The progression was downward and 
there was every indication that behaviors would have reached baseline 
level if the fifth phase had not been implemented. In any event, the 
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safe behaviors did decline once the com-pJnents were removed, 
indicating the effects of these com-pJnents. 
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'Ihe second issue addressed in the study was the imi:nrtance of 
specificity of feedback. 'Ihe method of distributing feedback was 
slightly different for the group feedback condition because it was not 
irrmediate. As the planned canparison illustrated, though, there was 
no difference between truck and group feedback; therefore, immediacy 
was no an im{X)rtant condition in this situation. Group and truck 
feedback were treated as the same category throughout the remaining 
analyses. 'Ihe planned comparisons showed that individual feedback was 
significantly different than truck and group feedback. The individual 
feedback group had the lower mean percentage during baseline but had 
he higher mean percentage during the Feedback and Goal-setting phase. 
'Ihis chang v.uuld suggest that the subjects were more affected by 
these com{X)n nts. Interestingly, once one additional person was added 
to Feedback and Goal -setting conditions, there might as well have been 
10 people receiving this same treatment. 'Illis fact would answer some 
of the questions raised by Ilgen et al. (1979). There was improvement 
in the group Feedback and Goal-setting phases, but individual feedback 
is more effective when dealing with these comi:nnents. 
One aspect of specificity of feedback that was not addressed in 
this study is how minute feedback can be and still be meaningful. 
For instance, in this study a simple percentage was given as feedback. 
Some subjects expressed a desire to know what specific behaviors they 
were performing badly. 'Ihe percentage did not give them this 
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information. Future studies might canpare different degrees of 
feedback, such as feedback given as a percentage, feedback given for 
specific behaviors performed badly and a percentage of total safe 
performance, or even feedback that tells specifically how many times 
each behavior was performed safely and how many times it was performed 
unsafely. 
Since the ohservers were not blind to the manipulations of the 
study, some of the results may be due to expectancy effects. Accident 
repor data are an unbiased dependent measure that were changed during 
intervention · therefore, expectancy effects might be ruled out. The 
only method definitely to ascertain whether expectancy effects biased 
the results would be to replicate the study with completely blind 
obs r¥ rs . 
Recorrmendations to the irrlividual in charge of Risk M:i.nagement 
and Training were made at the conclusion of this study. As mentioned 
by Feeney (1972), performance interventions are inexpensive to 
implement into the work place. The procedure could be carried out by 
the supervisors within the bureau. TI-te supervisors are required as 
part of daily routine to find the employees working the routes to 
assess progress of the day. The safety evaluation could take place at 
this point of the day. Very little training VK)Uld be required. 
Supervisory praise was not a component in this study, but this 
comJX)nent could add to the effects of feedback and goal -setting. 
Finally, another suggestion advocated converting the entire bureau 
to utilizing a behavioral safety program similar to this study. This 
~uld require some additional effort, h.It would probably show 
improvement throughout the bureau. 
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APPENDIX A 
INDIVIIlJAL CONSENT SHEET 
I agree to be involved in the study being carried out by 
Jeanine Williamson of the University of Central Florida. I llllderstand 
that this s udy will be concerned with improving safety. I understand 
that observers will be watching me ~rk once per week for 10 weeks. 
I will also receive feedback on my performance. I understand that my 
individual performance will not be told to my superiors. I understand 
that I can refuse to participate even after the study has started. 
Signature 
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APPENDIX B 
BEHAVIORAL CHECKLIST 
Safe Unsafe 
1. ~ars cloth gloves 
2. Wears ''bump'' cap 
3. l'b more than 3 ft. from truck 
when throwing bags in 
4. Bends knees when picking up 
bags' ooxes' and shrubs 
5. Stands beside the truck when 
blade is in operation 
6. Steps down from truck one foot 
at a time 
7. Checks traffic before stepping 
off truck 
8. Looks forward when the truck 
is moving 
9. Bends knees when going over 
bwnps, use as shock absorbers 
10. Uses both hands to hold onto 
bar when truck is moving 
11. Steps off truck before picking 
up bag 
12. Fills hopper only 3/4 full 
13. Wears eye protection 
14. Gives hand signals to driver 
when turning and backing; signals 
other cars 
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